

Daily Report 205/2021

2 September 2021¹


Summary

- In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 21 ceasefire violations, including three explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 96 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded 41 explosions ceasefire violations, including 34 explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 48 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM corroborated reports of two civilian casualties in non-government-controlled Pikuzy, Donetsk region.
- The Mission saw damage to four inhabited civilian properties in non-government-controlled Kashtanove, Donetsk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the operation of and repairs to critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at four entry-exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Berdianske and in non-government-controlled Novoazovsk, both in southern Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 1 September 2021. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

³ Including explosions.



⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 1 September 2021



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources : Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas ; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 02/09/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 21 ceasefire violations, including three undetermined explosions. The majority of ceasefire violations occurred in areas south of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) (see below) and in areas north of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 96 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded 41 ceasefire violations, including 34 explosions (25 outgoing and incoming, and nine undetermined). All ceasefire violations occurred in areas north-east of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 48 ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has recorded at least 53,768 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 15,530 explosions, 10,470 projectiles in flight, 270 muzzle flashes, 216 illumination flares and at least 27,282 bursts and shots).

Two civilian casualties corroborated in Pikuzy, Donetsk region

The SMM followed up on reports of the death of a woman and injuries to a man in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk) on 2 August.

On 26 August, a man (in his fifties), who introduced himself as the partner of a deceased woman (in her fifties) told the Mission that on 2 August, he and his partner had been walking to their house on Vatutina Street, in the southern part of Pikuzy, when he had seen an object in the air followed by two explosions, one of which occurred close to them. The man told the SMM that both he and his partner had sustained injuries and had been brought to a hospital in Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), where his partner had undergone surgery but had succumbed to her injuries.

On 9 August, staff at a morgue in Starobesheve (non-government-controlled, 32km south-east of Donetsk) told the Mission that on 3 August, the body of a woman had been brought to the morgue and that the deceased had sustained shrapnel injuries to her left knee and her back. According to a death certificate issued by the morgue on 4 August, the woman died on 3 August due to an injury to her left kidney and loss of blood.

On 3 August, a resident of Pikuzy (man, age unknown) told the SMM over the phone that on 2 August, a man and his partner had been wounded close to their house on Vatutina Street.

Damage to four civilian properties in non-government-controlled Kashtanove, Donetsk region

The Mission followed up on reports of damage to four civilian properties in Kashtanove (non-government-controlled, 13km north of Donetsk).

On 31 August, at 22 Kurortna Street, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an impact crater in the rear garden of an inhabited single-storey house, assessed as recent and caused by probable mortar rounds. The Mission was unable to assess the direction of fire.

At 29 Kurortna Street, about 70m north-west of the crater, the same UAV spotted three shattered south-east facing windows of an inhabited single-storey house, a metal gate with damage to its lower part leaning against a wooden fence in the front yard, as well as a nearby tree with damage to its trunk. The SMM assessed the damage as recent and caused by the impact of an explosive object and shrapnel but was unable to assess the type of weapon or the direction of fire.

At 26 Kurortna Street, about 50m west of the crater, the same UAV spotted shrapnel marks on two north-west-facing windows of an inhabited single-storey house. The SMM assessed the damage as recent and caused by shrapnel from the impact at 29 Kurortna Street.

At 21 Vorovskoho Street, about 30m east-south-east of the crater and about 80m east-south-east of the abovementioned house at 26 Kurortna Street, the same UAV spotted another impact crater in the rear garden of an inhabited two-storey house. It also spotted some holes and damage to two north-west facing windows on the ground floor, two holes in a north-west-facing window on the second floor, two holes in the north-western part of the house's roof as well as damage to a nearby tree. The Mission assessed both the crater and the damage as recent and caused by an explosive object and shrapnel but was unable to assess the type of weapon or the direction of fire. A woman (in her sixties) told the Mission that the impact had occurred at about 07:00 on 28 August when she, her son, her daughter-in-law and her two grandchildren had been inside the house.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On 1 September, while positioned on Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-7km north-east, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) but within 5km of its periphery.

On 30 August, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote**, an SMM mini-UAV spotted that a trench on the eastern edge of road T-1316, at a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 80m south of the area's northern edge and about 2km west of the area's north-eastern corner, had been reconstructed and that vegetation between the road and the trench had been cleared (not seen in imagery from 29 June 2021).

On 1 September, while positioned at two locations near the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard 25 incoming and outgoing explosions of artillery rounds, eight undetermined explosions and seven bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote but within 5km of its periphery.

On the same day, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote, the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them).

The SMM again saw the seven previously observed containers located south of the disengagement area's southern edge and inside the area. Inside the disengagement area, about

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

350m north of its southern edge, the SMM saw again a [previously reported](#) underground structure covered by a green camouflaged net.

On the evening and night of 31 August–1 September, the SMM camera 2km east of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) recorded nine projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** but within 5km of its periphery.

On 1 September, while positioned at four locations near the disengagement area, the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in Donetsk region, the SMM saw two tanks in a government-controlled area as well as three howitzers and seven tanks in a training area in a non-government-controlled area.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the Mission observed two tanks in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and six tanks in two training areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (For further information, see the tables below.)

Indication of military and military-type presence in the security zone

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region and 18 armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including in a training area and in a residential area. (For further information, see the table below.)

Mine hazard signs near non-government-controlled Vasylivka, Donetsk region

About 3km east-south-east of Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the Mission saw five mine hazard signs (red rectangular boards with white skull and crossbones and “Danger! Mines!” written in Russian, not previously reported and assessed as recent) attached to a road barrier on the north-western side of road M-04.

On the northern edge of Sopyne (government-controlled, 101km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed five members of an international organization (a woman and four men, ages unknown) conducting de-mining activities in a field on the western side of a local road.

SMM facilitation of the operation and repairs of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

The SMM also monitored adherence to a localized ceasefire to enable repairs to a sewage treatment plant near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the Mission observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) was open, but did not observe any traffic passing through. The SMM also noted that the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) was closed.

In Luhansk region, the SMM observed that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska was open, with people queueing to travel in both directions.

The Mission noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open, but that the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

On 30 August, at the EECP near Zolote, an SMM UAV spotted two cranes, one of which removing concrete barrier blocks on the eastern edge of the EECP. Between the southern edge of the EECP and about 200m further south on the eastern edge of road T-1316, the same UAV spotted that about 6,000 square metres of vegetation had been cleared. (For previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 1 September 2021](#).)

On 1 September, at the checkpoint 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia, the SMM saw three workers (men, in their forties and fifties) clearing vegetation on the western side of road H-21.

Border areas outside government control⁶

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk, for about 20 minutes, the SMM observed three cars (including one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission also observed five cars (including three with “DPR” plates), a covered cargo truck and a minivan carrying eight people (mixed genders and ages) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission also monitored areas near the border with the Russian Federation near Markyne (94km south of Donetsk), Kovske (91km south of Donetsk), Kuznetsy (89km south-east of Donetsk), and Klynkyne (85km south-east of Donetsk), and observed no change in the security situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

⁶ According to decisions in 2014 by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, operations are officially designated as suspended at these and other border crossing points located outside government control.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report of 1 September 2021](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denials:

- At a checkpoint near Berdianske (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces denied the SMM passage east towards Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk), citing “orders from their superiors”.
- In Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations approached the Mission and, having learned that the SMM was following up on reports of civilian casualties, asked it to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:⁷

- SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during seven flights: twice near Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk); and once near Talakivka (government-controlled 90km south of Donetsk), Berdianske, Sopyne (government-controlled, 101km south of Donetsk), Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), and Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).
- The Mission cancelled three mid-range UAV flights due to GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, near Talakivka, Berdianske, and Sopyne.

⁷ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interferences could have originated from anywhere within the radius of tens of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Tables of weapons

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
1/9/2021	2	Tank (T-72)	Near Maksymilianivka (30km west of Donetsk)	Patrol
Non-government-controlled areas				
30/8/2021	3	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
	7	Tank (probable T-72)		

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
1/9/2021	1	Tank (T-64)	Near Kliuchove (84km south of Donetsk)	Patrol
	1		Near Pryvilne (72km south of Donetsk)	
Non-government-controlled areas				
1/9/2021	5	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, 90km south-east of Donetsk)	Patrol
	1	Tank (T-64)	In a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk)	

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
1/9/2021	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)	Near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)	Patrol
Non-government-controlled areas				
30/8/2021	7	Infantry fighting vehicle (probable BMP-1)	In a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk)	Mini-UAV
	1	Armoured recovery vehicle (VT-55)		
	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	In a residential area of Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk)	
	1	Anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)		
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)		
1/9/2021	8	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)	Near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk)	Patrol


⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 1 September 2021⁹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera 2km E of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km SW of Donetsk)	3-5km SE	Recorded	4	Projectile	WSW to ENE (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Petrivske)	N/K	31-Aug, 21:10
	3-5km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	WSW to ENE (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Petrivske)	N/K	1-Sep, 00:46
	3-5km SE	Recorded	4	Projectile	WSW to ENE (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Petrivske)	N/K	1-Sep, 00:47
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km NE of Donetsk)	3-5km ENE	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	1-Sep, 00:03
	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	1-Sep, 00:23
	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	1-Sep, 00:23
SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km NW of Donetsk city centre)	2-3km NNE	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	1-Sep, 00:21
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	4-6km N	Recorded	5	Projectile	SE to NW	N/K	31-Aug, 23:23
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	31-Aug, 23:25
	5-7km N	Recorded	1	Projectile	E to W	N/K	1-Sep, 04:49
Sopyne (government-controlled, 101km S of Donetsk)	4-5km E	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	1-Sep, 09:47
Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km NE of Luhansk)	5-7km NE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	1-Sep, 10:38
S edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 60km W of Luhansk)	1-2km N	Heard	5	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement)	N/K	1-Sep, 17:19-17:27
	1km N	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	1-Sep, 17:28
	2-3km N	Heard	2	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	1-Sep, 17:35-17:42
	2-3km N	Heard	6	Shot	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	Small arms	1-Sep, 17:35-17:42
Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km NW of Luhansk)	4-8km S	Heard	25	Explosion	Both incoming and outgoing (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	Artillery (type n/k)	1-Sep, 17:25-18:00
	4-5km S	Heard	1	Burst	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	HMG	1-Sep, 17:30

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).